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A global phenomenon – different legal
traditions 
Using electronic evidence in civil proceedings is an
increasing phenomenon across the world. Regardless of
legal traditions, we use computers, mobile telephones,
various electronic devices, all of which are now part of
networks. The information we store on electronic
equipment is potential evidence. A number of issues
arise that affect the legal landscape: the information
that the parties will have access to, legally and
practically; what restrictions there might be to obtain
access to the data; how different legal traditions cope
with such challenges, such as whether the rules
function according to the intention for the rule. This
article is based on a comparative study of two different
jurisdictions: England & Wales and Norway.
General 
The English legal system is a common law system, and
judges develop many of the primary legal principles
from case to case in a system of precedent.1 Common
law is traditionally compared with Germanic and Roman
legal families, known as civil law. Civil law is generally
rule-based and tends to express ideas in abstract,
conceptual and symmetrical terms. When common law
proceeds from case to case, civil law proceeds from
general principle to general principle.2
The Norwegian legal system is part of what is often
recognized as Nordic law, due to the close relation of
language, history, nature, religion and common legal
habits.3 In the grand comparative theories, Nordic law
has normally been conceived of as a mix between
powerful Germanic and weaker common law elements.4
Germanic and Nordic law has the same basic
commitment to a particular doctrine of legal sources,
with legislation as the supreme source of law. However,
Nordic legal thinking is said to be more practical and
tangible than in Central Europe.5 Zweigert and Kötz are
of the opinion that ‘it would be right to attribute the
Nordic laws to the Civil Law, even although, by reason of
their close interrelationship and their common ‘stylistic’
hallmarks, they must undoubtedly be admitted to form
a special legal family, alongside the Romanistic and
German legal families’.6 In the field of civil procedure,
Norwegian law seems to lean towards common law. The
English Civil Procedure Rules were one of the main
sources of inspiration when the Norwegian civil
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procedure law, the Dispute Act (DA) of 2005, was
enacted.7
Disclosure 
Overview of the English rules
Introduction
In both English and Norwegian civil procedure, the
parties are responsible for obtaining and presenting
evidence. English civil procedure is based on the Civil
Procedure Act of 1997 and the Civil Procedure Rules
(CPR) of 1998. The collection of evidence is done by the
rules of disclosure. CPR 31.6 requires a party to
disclose:
a) the documents on which he relies; and
b) the documents which-
i) adversely affect his own case;
ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or
iii) support another party’s case; and
c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a
relevant practice direction.
There are three matters that must be considered when
disclosing documents – in our case electronic
documents.8 First, there has to be a ‘document’.
Pursuant to CPR 31.4, a ‘document’ is ‘anything in which
information of any description is recorded’. This means
that all kinds of electronically stored information (ESI)
also are considered as documents.9 The CPR is regularly
supplemented by practice directions (PDs), which
regulates areas within the CPR. Practice Direction 31B
(31BPD) regulates Disclosure of Electronic Documents
and applies to all proceedings started on or after 1
October 2010. Taken together with Practice Direction
31A, they replace the previous Practice Direction 31.10
31BPD emphasizes as its first point that ‘document’ in
CPR 31.4 also extends to electronic documents.
The second matter that must be considered when
disclosing documents is whether the document in the
‘control’ (CPR 31.8) of a party. ‘Control’ is defined to
cover physical possession, the right to possession, and
the right to inspect or take copies. The requirement is
not limited in time: disclosure documents are those
‘which are or have been’ in the party’s control.11 With
two exceptions, a party is not required to disclose
documents that do not already exist.12 In these
exceptional cases, the court has power to require a
party to create a document, which must then be
disclosed. However, it seems that the information
contained in the document must either already be in the
party’s possession, or at least be available to him.13
The third matter is the scope of the obligation, that is,
those documents that should be included in the
disclosure. The Civil Procedure Rules have limited the
amount of documents that should be disclosed from the
previous Peruvian Guano test to ‘standard disclosure’,
mentioned above in rule 31.6.14 In Nichia Corporation v
Argos Limited, Jacob LJ commented on this development:15
‘[…] the disclosing party should, before making
disclosure, consider each document to see whether it
adversely affects his own or another party’s case or
supports another party’s case. It is wrong just to
disclose a mass of background documents which do not
really take the case one way or another.’ The court has,
however, the power to exceed or limit the ‘standard’ level.16
A reasonable search 
According to the provisions of CPR 31.7, the disclosing
party is required to make ‘a reasonable search’ for
documents falling within rule 31.6(b) or (c). This
requirement needs some brief additional comments.
There are substantial differences between paper
documents and electronic documents, and this
influences the disclosure process.17 First, the volume of
electronic documents is usually significant compared
with paper documents. This is partly due to the fact that
electronic documents are more easily duplicated and
that e-mail has opened new opportunities to
disseminate information. Thus there is substantially
more information than previously.18 Second, electronic
7 The Report of the Committee on the Dispute Act,
NOU 2001:32: Rett på sak, p 181-185. The report
is available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/
jd/dok/nouer/2001/nou-2001-32.html?id=378579,
including the draft statute and summary in
English.
8 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), p.
123.
9 In Norwegian civil procedure ESI is recognized as
‘real evidence’ – a thing, not a document, the
Dispute Act § 26-1. However, this distinction is
only effective upon the presentation of the
evidence in court, which is not the topic of this
article.
10 CPR 31BPD 1.4.
11 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 142.
12 CPR 18.1 (1) b and 35.9.
13 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 143.
14 Compagnie Financière du Pacifique v Peruvian
Guano Co. (1882) 11 Q.B.D. 55 at 63.
15 Nichia Corporation v Argos Limited [2007] EWCA
Civ 741 at 46.
16 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 128.
17 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, pp. 188-189.
18 Stephen Mason and Burkhard Schafer, ‘The
Characteristics of Electronic Evidence in Digital
Format’, in Stephen Mason, gen ed, Electronic
Evidence (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths,
2010), p. 31.
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documents are more difficult to dispose of than paper
documents, and businesses have different retention
policies, making it uncertain what will be found. In
addition, the lack of order in which electronic
documents are stored challenges the sorting process.
Third, electronic documents may be manipulated, either
deliberately or accidentally. Surveying the authenticity
of electronic evidence is expensive and uses resources,
and an extensive survey is not always proportionate in
civil litigation.
The above mentioned challenges are reflected in
Practice Direction 31B.19 The direction provides for
additional rules regarding the extent of what constitutes
a reasonable search in rule 31.7, and sets out the factors
that may be relevant in deciding the reasonableness of
a search for electronic documents. The practice direction
also encourages the parties at an early stage, preferably
before the first case management conference, to discuss
the use of technology in the management of electronic
documents, including the scope of a reasonable search,
the use of agreed key words, and the use of agreed
software tools.20 The failure of one party to follow the
guidance is illustrated in Digicel (St. Lucia) Limited v
Cable & Wireless Plc.21 Without any agreement, the
defendant conducted what they thought was a
reasonable search. The defendant’s exercise cost some
£2 million and some 6,700 man hours of lawyers’ time.22
Morgan J concluded that the defendant had not carried
out a reasonable search, and ordered new searches of
sources and searches with new key words that had not
been considered.23
Proportionality
The overriding objective in the practice direction
includes dealing with the case in ways that are
proportionate.24 This was considered in Nichia
Corporation v Argos Limited.25 Jacob LJ stated that
‘Proportionality requires that the procedure to be
adopted be tailored to the size of the dispute’.26 The
issue of proportionality was also considered in Digicel
(St. Lucia) Limited v Cable & Wireless Plc, at 80-82.
Morgan J admitted that it was necessary to consider the
proportionality when adding additional key words, and
it was unfortunate that the dispute about the extent of
the key word searches came to court after the
defendants acted unilaterally in choosing key words and
conducting a search. He considered however, that ‘in
disregarding the clear advice in Part 31 Practice
Direction, the Defendants have exposed themselves to
the risk that the Court will conclude that their search
was inadequate and that the Court should order the
Defendants to carry out a further search’.
Sanctions pursuant to English rules 
General
Pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules, the duty to
disclose evidence adversely affecting your own case is
quite clear: it is necessary to conduct a proportionate,
reasonable search of documents in the control of the
party, and to disclose those which supports one owns or
another party’s case, or those which adversely affects
one owns or another party’s case. The sanctions for not
complying with the rules are mentioned in part 3 of the
CPR. There are three main sanctions under the CPR: cost
orders (CPR 3.8(2)), an order to stay proceedings (CPR
3.1(2)(f)), and striking out in part or whole, a claim or
defence (CPR 3.4(2)(c)).27 An order to strike out a case is
recognized as the strictest sanction. Where a party has
failed to comply so that a fair trial is no longer possible,
the court is bound to refuse to allow the party to take
further part in the proceedings and (where appropriate)
to determine the proceedings against him.28 The party
may apply for relief from the sanction. Such an
application must be supported by evidence. A failure to
comply can also be met by new orders from the judge,
such as to disclose certain evidence within a period of
time, or to cooperate so a digital evidence specialist can
analyze the material.
Order for disclosure 
Even with strict sanctions, there is a possibility that a
party might try to conceal evidence. The more the court
has the impression of a party trying to conceal evidence,
the more they are willing to order further disclosure. In
Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc, Morgan J
stated the following:
‘Further, even if a claim of conspiracy might lack
particulars of the individual steps and the trial by
inference from overt acts and, so far as I can tell in
19 CPR 31BPD 8.
20 CPR 31BPD 4.
21 [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch).
22 Digicel (St. Lucia) Limited v Cable & Wireless Plc
[2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch) at 25.
23 Digicel (St. Lucia) Limited v Cable & Wireless Plc
[2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch) at 67, 70 and 95.
24 CPR 31BPD 8.20.
25 [2007] EWCA Cv 741.
26 Nichia Corporation v Argos Limited [2007] EWCA
Cv 741 at 53, cf. Stephen Mason, ‘England &
Wales’, in Electronic Evidence, p. 371.
27 Neil Andrews, English Civil Procedure:
Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice System
(OUP, 2003), p. 364. A ‘stay’ is explained by
Andrews as the court’s power to ‘blow the
whistle and tell the parties to leave the field for a
period to cool off (a ‘stay’) and to explore the
chances of settlement […]’, see Neil Andrews,
English Civil Procedure: Fundamentals of the New
Civil Justice System, p. 139.
28 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 442.
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this case, the Claimants have pleaded overt acts of
delay and obstruction and can ask the Court to infer
that the similarity in the Defendants’ behaviour across
several jurisdictions was not a matter of coincidence,
but was a matter of conspiracy. Further, I accept the
Claimants’ general submission that because the
tendency of conspirators is to conceal rather than to
reveal, proper disclosure is all the more important in a
conspiracy claim.’29
In this instance, Morgan J, based on the allegation of
conspiracy, found it necessary to order further
disclosure, although he also considered proportionality
at 46:
‘It is no doubt true that where there is a conspiracy
the conspirators are careful not to leave written
records of their conspiracy behind them. However, it is
also well known that people say things in e-mails
which they would not dream of putting into a letter or
a minute or a formal note. Further, in litigation
involving allegations of conspiracy or similar
allegations, it may only take one revealing statement
in a document, perhaps an e-mail to show clearly
what people really thought or what people really were
intending to achieve […] Against that, it must be
remembered that what is really required by an order
for standard disclosure is ‘a reasonable search’ for
relevant documents. Thus, the rules do not require
that no stone should be left unturned. […] This
attitude is justified by considerations of
proportionality.’
In this context, Morgan J referred to Nichia Corporation v
Argos Limited.30 Considerations of proportionality were
also the centre of discussion in Goodale v The Ministry
of Justice.31 The claimants were convicted prisoners
admitted into the prison system of England & Wales,
who were all drug addicts and therefore admitted to a
detoxification regime. The policy was, alleged by the
claimants, that ‘one size fits all’. This caused the
prisoners unnecessary pain and suffering, and in one
case a prisoner died. The unusual feature of this case is
that the Ministry of Justice did not want to carry out any
search for ESI. The Minister argued that it would be
disproportionate to carry out the exercise, and
produced some provisional statistics as to the quantity
of documents that would be necessary to search. Senior
Master Whitaker commented on this argument at 13
(emphasis in the original):
‘It would have to be totally disproportionate to make
any search of electronically stored documents in
terms of PD31 2A(4) to be able to avoid doing so
altogether. I do not see in this case any reason arising
out of the volume of documents to be searched, for
not ordering that the defendants disclose
electronically stored documents in this case and I will
order them so to do.’
This was not a case of conspiracy as in Digicel, but
Senior Master Whitaker still had the impression that the
defendants were trying to conceal evidence adversely
affecting their own case:
‘In my judgment it would be totally wrong to require
the claimants to accept only the disclosure of
documents that exist in paper form because it is not
going to reveal, or the chances are quite strong it is
not going to reveal the actual communications
containing the thoughts and opinions and evidential
experience of those persons working for the
defendant which are going to be the most helpful to
the claimant in revealing documents that damage the
defendant’s case.’32
The case of Fiddes v Channel 4 TV Corporation33 was an
appeal against an order refusing an application for
specific disclosure in a libel action. The appellant, Mr
Fiddes, had applied for an order that Studio Lambert
Limited carry out a search of its IT system’s back-up
tapes for deleted e-mail communications. Tugendhat J
did not find this search necessary. He stated that in this
case, it was a matter of speculation whether the search
would produce anything relevant, and if it did, whether
it would help the claimant’s case or undermine it. The
members of the Court of Appeal had the same opinion.
The appellant tried to take the respondent’s credibility
in doubt, but even the fact that one of the respondent’s
laptops was stolen from the defendant’s home the day
before it was to be collected, and also the fact that the
respondent changed her explanation for deleting her e-
mail, did not affect the court’s decision. The appellant
was not able to convince the court that he was likely to
find something of significance in the deleted e-mails,
and the court, referring to PD31 2A.4(d) (now
31BPD.8.21(5)), was not convinced that the specific
disclosure was necessary.
29 Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc
[2010] EWHC 2522 (Ch) at 15.
30 [2007] EWCA Cv 741.
31 [2010] EWHC B40 (QB).
32 Goodale v The Ministry of Justice [2010] EWHC
B40 (QB) at 20.
33 Fiddes v Channel 4 TV Corporation [2010] EWCA
Civ 516.
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Cost sanctions 
The failure of not paying attention to the Practice
Directions can draw adverse comments on the party’s
behaviour.34 In Digicel (St. Lucia) Limited v Cable &
Wireless Plc, neither party paid attention to the advice
in PD31 2A.2, stating that the parties should at an early
stage in the litigation discuss issues that may arise
regarding searches for electronic evidence.35 The same
mistake was made in Earles v Barclays Bank Plc.36 The
claimant was a property developer who claimed that he
had sustained consequential loss and damage, due to
unauthorised transfers by his bank. The parties
neglected the advice in PD31 2A.2, and did not discuss
issues regarding electronic disclosure prior to the case
management conference. The electronic disclosure
provided from the bank did not include the telephone
records of the bank, relevant Transfer Sheets to record
instructions received from customers over the telephone
or relevant e-mails between the relationship manager
for the bank and the claimant. Simon Brown QC J stated
however, that ‘even though the failure to disclose such
critical information to assist the Court is surprising and
to be deplored, there is no evidence that it has been
done deliberately or constitutes spoliation in order to
gain a tactical evidential advantage at the trial’.37 The
bank succeeded in case, but because of the negligence
for failing to follow the Practice Direction and for not
disclosing the relevant ESI, the bank was not awarded
costs as is usually for a successful party (CPR 44.3).
Simon Brown QC J underlined that a cost order ‘must
objectively be a reasonable one for the unsuccessful
party to bear. The overriding objective requires the court
to observe ‘proportionality’ and to ‘ensure that the
parties are on an equal footing’.’38 He concluded that
awarding the bank 25 per cent of their costs was ‘a sum
that is proportionate and fair’.39
Strike out
In some cases, a party has already deleted or lost ESI of
significance for the case. The deletion of evidence can
be a sign that the party had attempted to conceal
evidence. An example of this is Marius Rybak v Langbar
International Limited.40 On several occasions, Rybak had
failed to comply with disclosure orders. Days before his
computers were ultimately handed over for inspection
by a digital evidence specialist at the order of the court,
he used a program called ‘Erase Free Space’, which
overwrote all the deleted files. Morgan J concluded that
this was done intentionally. Rybak’s witness statement
was not very trustworthy and Morgan J concluded at 76:
‘I also say that I should send a very clear message to
Mr Rybak and anyone else who considers behaving as
he has done. The court will not assist a litigant in
destroying data and will not assist a litigant to fight a
case on the limited material that that litigant chooses
to make available, suppressing other material which
would be material to the decision of the court.’
To compound the bad behaviour, Rybak failed to obey
an ‘unless’ order, providing for the consequences of a
breach. Morgan J found no reason for relieving Rybak
from this consequence, and the claim and the defence
to the counterclaim were struck out.
In Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir,41 one of the
defendants, Jevitia Sa, had upgraded their computers
after having given disclosure by list. The upgrade did
not involve the copying of files from previous computers
to new ones, and the previous hard disks had been
wiped clean.42 When the claimant applied for further
disclosure, there were hardly any ESI of relevance.
Lewison J stated at 22:
‘So far the wiped hard disks are concerned, although
the practice direction does refer to deleted documents
and metadata, as included within the category of
electronic documents, I do not consider that a party
who is required to give standard disclosure is
automatically required to subject hard drives to
expensive forensic recovery techniques. It is in all
cases a question of proportionality.’
Lewison J did not strike out the case. The decisive factor
was probably that the missing evidence could have
given strong support to Jevitia’s case. Jevitia was not
trying to conceal documents supporting the claimant
and Lewison J was not persuaded that the consequence
of Jevitia’s action was that a fair trial was no longer
possible, or that there was not a substantial risk that a
fair trial was no longer possible.
There are classes of documents which may be
34 Stephen Mason, ‘England & Wales’, in Electronic
Evidence, pp. 363-364.
35 Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc
[2010] EWHC 2522 (Ch) at 47.
36 Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500
(Mercantile).
37 Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500
(Mercantile) at 41.
38 Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500
(Mercantile) at 80.
39 Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500
(Mercantile) at 86.
40 [2010] EWHC 2015 (Ch).
41 [2010] EWHC 3227 (Ch).
42 Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2010]
EWHC 3227 (Ch) at 14.
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withheld from inspection in the disclosure process. With
three exceptions, the existence of documents falling
within these classes must still be disclosed by the
litigant by including them in the list.43 Although
disclosure normally will have to be given, protective
limitations may be introduced at the stage of inspection.
This topic is beyond the remit of this article.
Comparison with the Norwegian rules44
The duty to provide evidence 
Pursuant to Norwegian civil procedure rules, each party
has the duty and right to present their version of the
facts, substantiated by evidence.45 However, the
Norwegian Dispute Act (DA) is not similar to English
disclosure.46 The parties can choose which evidence
they will present to the court – there are no rules of a
technical nature, such as the English rule of best
evidence, the rule of hearsay, or the rule of direct and
indirect evidence. However, the court may limit the
presentation of evidence if the evidence is not relevant,
if is not suited to strengthen the case, or noteworthy, or
if the court finds it necessary to have the evidence
presented in another way.47
Unlike the English procedural rules, Norwegian law
does not require a party to present evidence that
adversely affects his own case, but the parties shall
ensure that the factual basis of the case is correct and
complete. They must provide such explanations and
summaries of evidence as are required to fulfil this
obligation, and they have a duty to give testimony and
provide access to the evidence.48 A party is required to
attach all the documentary evidence he intends to
present in court to the pleadings, so the counterparty is
able to prepare for the trial. A party is also required to
inform the other party about the existence of important
evidence that they have reason to believe that the
opposite party is not aware. This applies irrespective of
whether such evidence is in favour of the party notifying
the other of the existence of the evidence, or in favour
of the opposite party.49 The last section of the provision
is a development, bringing the provisions contained in
the previous Dispute Act from 1915, and moving
Norwegian civil procedure closer to the English
version.50 The previous Dispute Act was closer to the
German and Austrian approach, where a party is only
responsible for presenting evidence supporting his own
case.51 Pursuant to the preparatory work to the Dispute
Act, which is considered a legal source in accordance
with Norwegian legal jurisprudence, the obligation to
provide information is a general obligation. This should
lead to the conclusion that the parties in general are
required to provide information on evidence adversely
affecting their own case.52 In reality, the obligation is
interpreted in a far weaker way.
In practice, the parties tend to ignore the provision,
and the sanctions for not informing the other party
about evidence adversely affecting their own case are
few and seldom used. The sanctions available to the
judge are discussed below. The new provision provides
a change of orientation away from the Germanic
principle that a party is responsible for its own case,
and can choose which evidence to present to
substantiate their view. The lawyers’ code of ethics
requires lawyers, within the legal framework and to the
best of their ability, to protect their clients’ interests,
and might also reflect the lawyers’ choice of action.53
The result is that Norway operates between the
Germanic and the common law approach. This provision
is seldom challenged, probably because of the rare use
of sanctions by the judiciary.
Challenges with ESI54
If the evidence a party wants to present is not in his
hands, he has three possible options (assuming that the
conditions are met). The main procedure is simply to
request the person in control of the evidence to gain
access to it or to provide a copy. Assuming that the
party making the request knows what it is looking for
and the evidence is easy to specify, this is a practical
way of obtaining evidence. As previously mentioned, the
counterparty is obliged to contribute, providing the
evidence is relevant to the case.
The problem arises when a party is not certain of
exactly what they are looking for. It is much more
difficult to request the evidence, and this problem
usually increases when the material is stored
electronically. There could be several different versions
of the file or it is not known how or where the material is
81© Pario Communications Limited, 2011 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8
43 The exceptions are cases of penalties made
recoverable by virtue of any enactment, Bank of
England Act 1998, s.82 and documents covered
by public interest immunity. See Paul Matthews
and Hodge M. Malek QC, Disclosure, p. 203.
44 The author is responsible for the translations
from Norwegian to English.
45 DA § 21-3.
46 For a survey in English of the main features of
Disputes Act 2005, see Inge Lorange Backer, ‘The
Norwegian Reform of Civil Procedure’, in Peter
Wahlgren, ed, Scandinavian Studies in Law
(Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law,
2007), pp. 42-75.
47 DA § 21-7.
48 DA § 21-4 (1).
49 DA § 21-4 (2) and § 5-3.
50 DA (1915) § 188.
51 Dr Wolfgang Freund, Dr Erich Schweighofer and
Lothar Farthofer, ‘Austria’, p. 56, and Dr
Alexander Duisberg and Henriette Picot,
‘Germany’, p. 340, in Stephen Mason, gen ed,
International Electronic Evidence (British Institute
of International and Comparative Law, 2008).
52 Ot.prp. no. 51 (2004-2005), p. 454.
53 The Norwegian Bar Regulation, ch. 12 sec. 1.2 (2).
54 For an overview of the Norwegian rules regarding
electronic evidence, see Harald Hjort and Svein
Willassen, ‘Norway’, in International Electronic
Evidence.
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CONTROL OF AND ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE OPPOSING PARTY: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW
82 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8 © Pario Communications Limited, 2011
stored. The more diffuse information there is, the more
difficult is it to get the evidence. A second solution is to
apply for the ‘taking of evidence’ within the litigation.55
This is a convenient option if seeking ESI from third
parties, such as banks, telephone companies or
hospitals, and the counterparty is not able to provide
such data. When the counterparty is in control of the
evidence, there is always a risk that the evidence might
be tampered with or modified. This risk is reduced to a
minimum when a third party is in control of the
evidence. The party can therefore apply for a taking of
evidence without fearing that the application, including
a notice to the counterparty, will result in tampered or
modified evidence.
The challenge usually occurs when evidence is in the
hands of the counterparty and the party making the
request fears the evidence will be destroyed or lost, a
common fear regarding ESI. Notifying the counterparty
might, depending on the personality of the people
involved, tempt certain people to delete the evidence,
and since the courts rarely impose sanctions, a party
usually judges that it is not worth the risk of making
such a request. The party may then, as a third option,
apply for a ‘securing of evidence’, which is similar to the
English pre-action search. If there is a reason to fear
that notifying the counterparty will prevent evidence
from being secured, the securing could be undertaken
without notifying the counterparty. Even though the
securing of evidence is meant to be an exceptional
procedure, dealing with ESI it is quite often the only
reasonable solution. This is discussed further below.
Comparison of sanctions 
The court’s inference of the parties’ actions 
As a general comment, it seems much easier to
withhold any ESI that adversely affects the case of a
party pursuant to Norwegian law, rather than under
English procedure. If the opposing party is not aware of
the evidence or not familiar with the details, it is difficult
for them to obtain access to the evidence. On the other
hand, the Dispute Act provides for some sanctions.
The most commonly used sanction is the fact that the
parties’ actions are reflected in the evaluation of
evidence. The Norwegian legal system is based on the
free evaluation of evidence and the evaluation shall,
pursuant to DA § 21-2, be based on facts that come to
light during the trial. The judge will base their judgment
on the facts they find most likely. In this assessment,
the judge is expected to use their reasonable discretion
and general principles of experience, universal human
insights about people’s behaviour and alleged motives
for their behaviour. When a party fails to fulfil his
obligation to present relevant evidence and this is
believed to be intentional, it is reasonable to conclude
that he has something to hide that is likely to weaken
his case. Where there is reasonable doubt, the court
must be able to emphasize this. In other words, there is
an onus of proof that adversely affects the party who
has control of evidence and neglects to provide it.
Even though the English civil procedure rules do not
operate with free evaluation of evidence, the court is
open to draw adverse inferences where a party does not
provide proper disclosure or has destroyed documents.
The court may take it into consideration in assessing
the credibility generally of the person in default, or it
may draw the inference that the specific document
unfavourable to the cause of the party who has
destroyed it or has failed to disclose it.56 Even if this is
not recognized as a formal sanction in accordance with
to the English rules, English judges have a similar ability
to deal with such failures.
Cost sanctions
Another common sanction is to order the restraining
party to pay the counterparty’s litigation costs. This
assessment is undertaken in nearly every case,
pursuant to DA chapter 20. The general rule is, as with
the English rules, that the unsuccessful party will be
ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, for
which see CPR 44.3(2)(a) and DA § 20-2. However, a
party who has been successful to a significant degree
without having won the case may, pursuant to § 20-3,
be awarded costs from the opposite party in full or in
part, if weighty reasons suggest so. An example of this
is the case A v B from the Borgarting Court of Appeal.57
The case was about the breakdown of a relationship,
and the parties could not agree on the value of some
shares in a company.58 The court found that:
‘It is emphasized that A both before trial and during
the trial has failed to submit relevant material to the
case that he has access to. The appellate court agrees
with the District Court’s review. Regarding the
appellate court’s view, several inquiries from the
55 DA ch. 27.
56 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 434.
57 LB-2008-186582.
58 In Norway family cases are handled by the DA–
there are no special procedure rules as in
England & Wales.
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counsel for B or assistants were directed to A, but
with rather a cautious response. The court does not
consider it necessary to go into the various requests
and responses in detail, but assume that it was
necessary for B to go to court to get the necessary
insight into A’s business activities in the X AS.’59
The Borgarting Court of Appeal found that these
reasons were sufficiently compelling to award partial
costs to B (Dispute Act § 20-3), and B was awarded
costs for the proceedings in the District Court.
The English rules provides the court with the
discretion as to whether the costs are payable by one
party to another, the amount of those costs and when
they are to be paid.60 The CPR sets out a non-exhaustive
list of orders, which the court may make, for which see
CPR 44.3(6). The orders have to apply reasons of
proportionality.61
By the Norwegian rules, a party may be awarded
costs in full or in part, irrespective of the outcome of the
case, if the costs have arisen due to the negligence of
the opposite party, pursuant to DA § 20-4(c). In the case
Clivden Eiendom AS v the State by the Tax Collector in
Oslo, the Tax Collector in Oslo demanded bankruptcy
proceedings to be initiated against Clivden because of a
presumption of insolvency.62 It transpired that Clivden
had submitted a tax return, but neglected to inform the
Tax Collection Office. This meant that Clivden was
entitled to tax deductions and was not insolvent. The
company was still required to cover the opposite party’s
costs, because the costs had arisen due to Clivden’s
negligence.
In the case of Aanesen v Bellmann Mathisen and
others, the question was whether Aanesen had failed to
present important documents prior to legal action,
pursuant to DA § 5-3.63 The Supreme Court determined
that the obligation at this stage involved only a duty to
provide information about a document, not to present it.
The action (or lack of action) was not considered as a
failure, and Aanesen was therefore not ordered to pay
the opposite party’s cost in accordance with DA § 20-
4(c). The result would be different if Aanesen failed to
present evidence after the case was filed. In this
respect, the provisions of DA § 20-4(c) are not
particularly useful for situations where the information
adversely affects the negligent party’s case. It is more
likely that the opposite party would in full or in part win
the case if the negligent party fails to present relevant
evidence.
In comparing the English and the Norwegian civil
procedure rules, it can be concluded that the rules
regarding costs between the parties have a marked
resemblance. The substantive content in the provisions
are also similar, and the rules seem to be used
frequently in both countries.
Penalty notices and strike out 
The strictest sanction in Norway is to issue the party
with a penalty notice, pursuant to DA § 16-7(2). A
penalty notice is an order from the court to a party to
carry out an earlier neglected action under the threat of
being considered to be absent in the case if the
deadline is neglected.64 The order requires that that the
action is carried out because it is essential to the
counterparty or necessary for the proper treatment of
the issue. The jurisdictional threshold is high, but the
consequences are strict. If the defendant fails to comply
with the order, the court may pronounce a judgment in
which the claimant succeeds partly or wholly, for which
see § 16-10. If the claimant fails to comply with its duty
to present evidence, the case may be dismissed in
accordance with § 16-9. A search on the Norwegian case
law databases on §§ 16-7, 16-9 and 16-10 indicate that
these sanctions are hardly used in situations where a
party is negligent in undertaking his obligations of
presenting evidence, regarding both paper documents
and ESI.65
The penalty notice rules resemble the English rules of
striking out. In both situations, the party is, after a
failure to comply with his obligations, issued an order
clearly stating the consequences of failing to comply
with the ‘unless’ order. The consequences are also
similar. According to the Norwegian rules, § 16-10 (2),
judgment by default must be based on the grounds of
the claimant’s allegations, provided that these have
been notified to the respondent and do not appear to be
clearly incorrect. The English rules do not have a similar
regulation, but the court will state the consequences of
not complying with the order. According to CPR 3.4(3),
the court may in addition make any consequential order
it considers appropriate.
The main difference is probably that even though the
rules about striking out are rarely used, they are used in
England, while such sanctions are hardly used in
Norway. It is not obvious why the rules are used
differently. It may be due to the different attitude of
59 LB-2008-186582, under the heading ‘Samlet
verdivurdering’.
60 CPR 44.3(1).
61 Peter T. Hurst, Civil Costs (4th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2007), p. 138.
62 LB-2010-62581.
63 Rt. 2009, p. 627.
64 Ot.prp.nr.51 (2004-2005), p. 425
65 http://www.lovdata.no/. Searches on the three
provisions were conducted on 10 June 2011.
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disclosing evidence. When expecting to be given all
relevant evidence, the withholding of evidence is
regarded as a failure of the obligation of disclosure.
Conversely, when both the parties and the court are
used to the fact that a party only presents evidence
supporting its own case, the situation will have to be
extreme before the court orders a party to present
evidence adversely affecting its own case. The reason
behind the difference could also be because judges
interpret the rules differently. When a rule is interpreted
in a specific strict way, the following cases will interpret
the provision the same way, and the high threshold to
meet the requirements reduces the amount of cases.
Another possibility, which is less plausible, is that
Norwegian litigation does not face the same problems
as in England, and that the limited use of the strongest
sanction is due to the fact that Norwegian parties
behave more properly. Unless there is empirical proof to
demonstrate that litigants in England & Wales are more
prone to destroy evidence or fail to obey orders of the
court than litigants in Norway, this argument is not
persuasive. When comparing the two systems, the
opposite is more probable: a system with less control of
the presentation of evidence will, to a larger extent,
tempt the parties to withhold evidence adversely
affecting their own case, especially evidence such as ESI
which are easily deleted (but not necessarily
expunged).66
Summary 
The general disclosure rules in the two countries are,
due to the different legal systems and the traditions,
quite unlike. In England & Wales, failing to present
evidence will certainly adversely affect the party’s case.
In comparison, judges in Norway seem to a much larger
extent to accept that files ‘unfortunately’ have been
deleted, or that they no longer exist for some reason.
Parties to litigation in Norway, unlike their counterparts
in England, are not instructed to preserve evidence.67
Even though the parties understand that they are not to
delete relevant evidence, the different approach taken
to sanctions between England & Wales and Norway
might reflect the attitude of the courts when relevant
material has mysteriously disappeared. The problem is
that the sanctions are not used often, and the
interpretation of the rules has arguably been too strict.
The narrow interpretation of the rules fails to send out
the message to litigants that they will be penalised for
destroying evidence. Arguably, it should be possible to
create a civil procedure system that is able to handle
ESI as evidence without all the expenses that follows
with a disclosure.
Considering the differences, it is interesting to note
how many similarities there are. Norway has the same
sanctions for not complying with the rules, and the
same overriding objective as in England & Wales. The
Dispute Act Committee was inspired by Lord Woolf’s
reform paper, and the consideration of proportionality
was one of many elements the members brought into
the Dispute Act. As a preliminary conclusion, the
general disclosure rules relating to electronic evidence
functions better in England & Wales than in Norway.
Preliminary legal actions
Pre-action disclosure in England & Wales 
In both England and Norway the court may issue
preliminary orders before legal action begins. English
law provides for four types of order, but only one of
them gives the applicant the possibility of disclosing
evidence meant for use in subsequent litigation.68 Under
CPR 31.16(3) the court may make an order for pre-action
disclosure if the following requirements are met:
The court may make an order under this rule only
where-
(a) the respondent is likely to be a party to
subsequent proceedings;
(b) the applicant is also likely to be a party to those
proceedings;
(c) if proceedings had started, the respondent’s duty
by way of standard disclosure, set out in rule 31.6,
would extend to the documents or classes of
documents of which the applicant seeks
disclosure; and
(d) disclosure before proceedings have started is
desirable in order to–
(i) dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings;
(ii) assist the dispute to be resolved without
proceedings; or
66 For a discussion of this problem, see Stephen
Mason, Electronic Evidence, 2.17 – 2.18 and
individual chapters covering the different
jurisdictions.
67 31BPD 3, see also Stephen Mason, ‘England &
Wales’, Electronic Evidence, p. 385 ff.
68 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 57. Matthews and Malek mentions
three other preliminary actions; Norwich
Pharmacal orders, corporate insolvency and
applications to inspect the court files in other
litigation.
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(iii) save costs.
Previous to the CPR, the scope for pre-action disclosure
was limited to proceedings for personal injury and
death. Lord Woolf recommended that pre-action
disclosure should become available in all types of case,
although subject to special application.69 The
application must include a specification of what
documents or classes of documents are sought. The
narrower the disclosure requested and the more
determinative it may be of the dispute in issue between
the parties to the application, the easier it is for the
court to find the request well-founded; and vice versa.70
The court is given discretional powers to decide whether
pre-action disclosure pursuant to sub paragraph (d) is
‘desirable’ or not. Among the important considerations
are the nature of the injury or loss complained of; the
clarity and identification of the issues raised by the
complaint; the nature of the documents requested; the
relevance of any protocol or pre-action inquiries; and
the opportunity which the complainant has to make his
case without pre-action disclosure.71
Regarding ESI in the counterparty’s control, pre-action
disclosure could be an expedient tool to gain access to
the evidence at an early stage, when this is necessary
for the further proceedings of the case, to save costs or
to resolve the dispute without proceedings. It is difficult,
however, to find cases where access to ESI is the main
problem. Usually the applicants struggle to meet the
requirements for a pre-action disclosure, and the fact
that the evidence adversely affects the party in control
of the evidence seems to be of less importance.
In the case of Moresfield Limited v Banners (a firm),72
the parties had agreed on pre-action disclosure. After
four months of delay, before the disclosure was
commenced, the defendants abandoned the agreement,
claiming that the circumstances had now changed and it
was too late for pre-action disclosure. They also wanted
to avoid giving disclosure, arguing that the only
remaining relevant material in the scope of their
instructions was that emanating from the claimants.
Lawrence Collins J did not accept the argument, at 63:
‘I am also satisfied that the two files, which relate
exclusively to the work done by KPMG [the defendant]
in relation to this transaction, will, expressly or by
inference from the work done, tend to show what their
instructions were and whether they gave assurances
as alleged, and accordingly be within the scope of
standard disclosure with the potential to adversely
affect KPMG’s case.’
The disclosure was limited to two working files, and was
therefore clearly specified. The other requirements were
also met, and Lawrence Collins J did not find the
defendants reasons for their change of position
convincing, and ordered pre-action disclosure.
In Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited,73
Hutchinson claimed that its four principal competitors
had, by way of concerted practice and by way of an
abuse of their dominant position, prevented the
development of an efficient and effective alternative
Mobile Number Portability system, thereby restricting
and distorting the competition between Hutchinson and
the respondents. Hutchinson sought an order for pre-
action disclosure of a vast bulk of documents and
classes of documents to find evidence adversely
affecting the respondents. However, the court found the
request ‘so lacking specificity, that it is not possible to
accept that the entirety of the classes of documents are
‘likely’ or ‘may well’ fall within standard disclosure.’74
Securing of evidence in Norway 
The pre-action disclosure in Norway is called ‘securing
of evidence’, and the provision provides for the
following requirements:
§ 28-2 Vilkårene for bevissikring
Bevissikring kan begjæres når beviset kan få
betydning i en tvist hvor den som setter fram
begjæringen, vil kunne bli part eller partshjelper, og
det enten er en nærliggende risiko for at beviset vil gå
tapt eller bli vesentlig svekket, eller av andre grunner
er særlig viktig å få tilgang til beviset før sak er reist.
§ 28-2 Conditions for securing evidence
Evidence may be secured if it may be of importance in
a dispute of which the applicant may become a party
or intervener, in so far as there is a clear risk of the
evidence being lost or considerably impaired, or if
there are other reasons why it is of particular
importance to obtain access to such evidence prior to
the litigation being initiated.
69 Neil Andrews, English Civil Procedure:
Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice System, p.
617, Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report
(1996), ch. 12, paras 47-50.
70 Black v Sumitomo Corporation [2002] 1 WLR
1562, [2001] EWCA Civ 1819 at 72.
71 Black v Sumitomo Corporation [2002] 1 WLR
1562, [2001] EWCA Civ 1819 at 88.
72 [2003] EWHC 1602 (Ch).
73 [2008] EWHC 55 (Comm).
74 Hutchinson 3G UK Limited v O2 (UK) Limited
[2008] EWHC 55 (Comm) at 47, cf. Stephen
Mason, ‘England & Wales’, in Electronic
Evidence, p. 356.
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Originally this provision was created to make it
possible to obtain testimonial evidence if the witness
was so diseased that he or she would probably not be
able to attend court for an oral testimony, and for things
that would inevitably be destroyed waiting for the trial,
typically because they would rot or perish.75 The
provision is now frequently used to secure ESI.
The procedure is divided into two parts, the securing
process and the sorting process. The securing
procedure is as follows: A party applies for the securing
of evidence and the court considers the application and
may approve it. The court then orders the enforcement
officer to do the securing. If the evidence is
electronically stored, the enforcement officer is usually
assisted by technical staff, and forensic images of hard
disks, servers and other storage devices are frequently
made. The enforcement officer preserves the
information. Then comes the sorting process. If the
secured material is ESI, the parties will usually have to
agree on the search methods and key words to identify
the relevant evidence. If the applicant has limited
knowledge of the documents, files and logs he wants to
obtain access to, this could be an exhausting process.
This will be considered below. The technical staff sort
out the relevant material and this is submitted to the
applicant.
Overriding comments 
In comparing the English and Norwegian rules, there are
several observations to make. In Norway, it appears that
a party cannot expect to obtain access to all relevant
evidence through the duty to provide evidence. If the
evidence a party seeks is ESI, the only viable way is to
apply for the securing of evidence. The system does not
appear to be based on trust and co-operation, but on
mistrust and scepticism. Another striking difference
between English procedure and the rules in Norway, is
that the parties do not participate in the sorting process
in Norway. This task is delegated to technical staff paid
in advance 50/50 by both parties, and the final
allocation of costs is done by a cost order in connection
with the judgment. In England, the party giving
disclosure pays for these costs. Since the technical staff
are not hired by either of the parties in Norway, there is
no co-operation between the parties and the technical
staff. They work on the instructions agreed by both
parties. If the parties cannot agree, which is not
unusual, the court will have to decide the instructions.
In marked contrast to the English procedural rules, in
Norway there is an apparent lack of regulation related to
the implementation of the rules. The Practice Directions
in England & Wales provides for the order that things
should be done, and how the parties should behave. In
Norway, the Dispute Act hardly mentions anything
regarding the need to secure of evidence. DA § 28-4
proclaims: ‘The provisions on access to real evidence
and the taking of evidence in litigation shall apply
correspondingly to the securing of evidence as far as
they are appropriate’.76 The problem is that these
provisions are not appropriate, at least not for the
securing of ESI. The procedure for the securing of
evidence is then undertaken according to what the court
finds most appropriate. This differs from case to case
and from judge to judge, but the procedure mentioned
above is the procedure that most judges find reasonable
in the absence of similar guidelines set out in England.
To whom the provision applies 
Among the more detailed differences between England
and Norway, are how to specify to whom the provision
applies. DA § 28-2 requires that the applicant ‘may
become a party or intervener’, but provides no guidance
to the person or the company about where the securing
of the evidence will take place. In England, CPR 31.16
requires the respondent to be ‘likely to be a party to
subsequent proceedings’. However, pursuant to DA §
28-3 (2), the application must specify the opposing
party that is expected that any ensuing action will be
directed against. CPR 31.17 covers pre-action disclosure
against a person not a party, so the differences are
basically a question of structure.
Specification 
An important topic within securing of evidence is the
requirement for a specification of the evidence. A party
is obliged to specify the evidence it wants access to –
what kind of information and the nature of the evidence.
The provisions regarding the securing of evidence have
no requirements about specifying the evidence. It is
therefore necessary to consider the general obligation
to provide relevant evidence to the counterparty, more
specifically, the provisions of DA § 26-6:
§ 26-6 Utformingen av begjæring om bevistilgang
(1) En begjæring om tilgang til eller spørsmål om
75 NOU 2001:32: Rett på sak, p. 987.
76 § 28-4 Gjennomføringen av bevissikring. For
gjennomføringen av bevissikring gjelder reglene
om tilgang til realbevis og bevisopptak i rettssak
tilsvarende så langt de passer.
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realbevis skal spesifiseres slik at det er klart hvilke
bevisgjenstander kravet gjelder.
(2) Retten kan lempe på kravet til spesifikasjon
dersom dette er uforholdsmessig vanskelig å
etterkomme, og det er en nærliggende mulighet for at
kravet kan gi tilgang til bevis.
§ 26-6 The contents of an application for access to
evidence
(1) An application for access to or questions
concerning real evidence shall be specified in such a
manner that it is clear which item of evidence the
application relates.
(2) The court may relax the specification requirements
if these are unreasonably complicated to comply with,
provided that there is a clear possibility of the
application yielding access to evidence.
In Normarc v Norwegian Special Mission,77 the Supreme
Court stated, at 35 – 36, that is was not necessarily
appropriate to set the same standards for an application
to provide evidence as an application for securing
evidence, based on consideration of the aims and the
practical challenges: ‘Not least for electronically stored
data the practical circumstances could make it hard to
get far in the specification’.78 The court should, in the
exercise of its discretion, consider to what extent the
specification is possible and how likely it is to find
evidence that can be secured reasonably. The applicant
and later claimant, Normarc, claimed that former
employees had brought with them trade secrets when
they left Normarc and established NSM. The court
ordered the securing of evidence, and the respondent
was required to provide the enforcement officer and his
assistants access to the company’s premises in Oslo
and at Gardermoen Airport to make forensic images of
all the material on its servers, CDs, tapes and other
storage resources on the workstations of four former
employees, as well as all backup files from August 2003
to August 2004.79 The extent of the securing of evidence
is said to be equivalent to 285 million A4 pages and is
considered as one of the largest exercises of the
securing of evidence in Norway to date. The amount of
information and the challenge in sorting out the
relevant evidence may resemble English disclosure,
except for the significant difference that NSM is not the
one doing the sorting process. This is undertaken, as
mentioned in general terms above, by technical staff
operating on instructions from the court.
The Norwegian system is not used to handling such a
vast volume of information and has no rules or
regulations on how to operate such a sorting process.
The fact that the party who originally had the
information in their hands does not handle the sorting
process makes it even more difficult to conduct. The
parties agreed on some key words, but NSM objected to
revealing the result of this search, alleging that they
contain company secrets. Normarc then applied to use a
search method with MD5 hash checksum on the files in
the secured material for the purpose of carrying out an
automated comparison of metadata and MD5 hash
checksums of the content on Normarc’s own servers as
of January 2004. By comparing the lists of MD5
checksums, it is possible to see if the same checksum
can be found – and if so, to find out what hides behind
the checksum. In a judgment given in April 2011 in the
same case, the Court of Appeal required NSM to give
Normarc access to these checksums.80 The judgment is
final.
The jurisdictional threshold
Another important discussion is to compare the
jurisdictional threshold to the exercise of the
discretionary power. As mentioned above, the court can
order pre-action disclosure if it is ‘desirable’ and if
subsequent proceedings with the applicant and the
respondent as parties are ‘likely’. In Black v Sumitomo
Corporation,81 Rix LJ stated at 72 – 73 that ‘[…] ‘likely’
here means no more than ‘may well’. […] Temptations to
gloss the statutory language should be resisted. The
jurisdictional threshold is not, I think, intended to be a
high one.’ The Court of Appeal has expressed other
opinions in respect of the threshold. In Rose v Lynx
Express Ltd,82 the Black v Sumitomo case was not
referred to. Peter Gibson LJ expressed the view at 4 that
‘In our view it will normally be sufficient to found an
application under CPR 31.16(3) for the substantive claim
pursued in the proceedings to be properly arguable and
to have a real prospect of success, and it will normally
77 Rt. 2006, p. 626.
78 Rt. 2006, p. 626 at 35-36.
79 TOSLO-2004-42431.
80 LB-2010-149042.
81 [2002] 1 WLR 1562, [2001] EWCA Civ 1819.
82 [2004] EWCA Civ 447.
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be appropriate to approach the conditions in CPR
31.16(3) on that basis.’83 This requires that the case
must have a sufficient factual basis to support it. ‘An
applicant has not made out a good or properly arguable
case for breach […] if there is no credible evidence of
primary facts from one may at least be able to infer that
an act of infringement is likely to have taken place’.84
The two different tests have been discussed in later
cases and a conclusion has so far been drawn in Kneale
v Barclays Bank:85
‘If I had to decide which test was the correct one for
the “arguable case” jurisdictional threshold, I would
conclude that it was the lower one suggested by
Black v Sumitomo and by BSW v Balltec. […] [A]t the
pre-action stage where the whole purpose of the
application is to ascertain whether to bring a claim or
not, it cannot be right that the applicant has to
establish a case which is sufficiently arguable to have
a “real prospect of success” in the sense which that
phrase has under the CPR.’
Discussion has also focussed on the requirements in
sub paragraph (d) and in particular whether disclosure
is ‘desirable’ in order to dispose fairly of the anticipated
proceedings, to assist the resolution of the dispute
without initiating proceedings, or to save costs.
Tomlinson J stated the following regarding this matter:
‘That is a requirement which serves double duty in the
rule in that it is both a jurisdictional requirement and,
of course, a requirement, or one of the elements is
perhaps a better way to put it, which the court must
take into account in the overall exercise of its
discretion whether to order disclosure before the
proceedings have begun. It is not enough, therefore,
simply to conclude that disclosure before proceedings
have started is in general terms desirable simply in
the sense that it will enable the parties, or one of
them, to know more clearly where it will stand, but
the court must go further and conclude that, in all the
circumstances, it is appropriate that the court should
make an order of this sort, bearing in mind that the
rule is not couched in mandatory terms but is
introduced by the words ‘the court may make an
order under this rule only where’.’86
As part of the assessment related to sub paragraph (d),
Tomlinson J also requires the disclosure to be
‘necessary’. It is not a sufficient consideration to take a
case out of the ordinary run because a pre-action
disclosure would enable the applicant to ‘draft a more
focused pleading, or possibly to put some flesh upon
the bones’.87
The courts in Norway also have jurisdictional
thresholds in the exercise of the discretionary power.
Pursuant to DA § 28-2 the evidence ‘may be of
importance’ in a dispute and there has to be ‘a clear
risk’ of evidence being lost or considerably impaired, or
if there are other reasons why it is ‘of particular
importance’ to obtain access to such evidence prior to
the initiation of the action. As Tomlinson J explained
regarding CPR 31.16(3)(d), § 28-2 of the DA also serves
‘double duty’ in the rule. The court must take into
account both the jurisdictional requirement that it ‘may
be of importance’, and in addition one of the two
elements in the provision in the overall exercise of its
discretion whether to order disclosure before the
proceedings have begun.
In Oslo Bilauksjon AS v A and X AS,88 the Court of
Appeal stated that the first requirement, ‘may be of
importance in a dispute’, was a statement of the general
requirement of legal interest, founded in DA § 1-3 (2).89
An explaination of the subject of legal interest is not
within the scope of this article, but in short, the
requirement of legal interest is usually considered
regarding a writ, and since a securing of evidence
precedes this legal step, it would be necessary to
predict the result of this assessment. The Norwegian
requirement ‘may be of importance in a dispute’ could
be compared with the English requirement ‘likely’ in
CPR 31.16(3)(a) and (b), for which see Black v Sumitomo
Corporation at 72 on this point.
In respect of the second requirement, there are two
alternative conditions. The two elements are aimed at
two different situations. The first element describes a
kind of emergency situation – ‘a clear risk’ of evidence
being lost or considerably impaired – and this element
83 In BSW Limited v Balltec Limited [2006] EWHC
822 (Ch) at 20, Peter Gibson LJ referred to the
same threshold test in ED&F Man Liquid Products
Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 472. The threshold test in
Rose v Lynx Express was followed and applied in
Pineway Limited v London Mining Company
Limited [2010] EWHC 1143 (Comm) at 21-22.
84 BSW Limited v Balltec Limited [2006] EWHC 822
(Pat) at 20.
85 Kneale v Barclays Bank Plc [2010] EWHC 1900
(Comm) at 37
86 Trouw UK Ltd v Mitsui & Co (UK) Plc [2006] EWHC
863 (Comm), [2007] UKCLR 921 at 19.
87 Trouw UK Ltd v Mitsui & Co (UK) Plc [2006] EWHC
863 (Comm), [2007] UKCLR 921 at 43. The test
was followed and applied in Pineway Limited v
London Mining Company Limited [2010] EWHC
1143 (Comm) at 52.
88 LB-2010-202642.
89 ‘§ 1-3 The subject matter and character of legal
action […] (2) The party bringing the action must
establish a genuine need for having the claim
determined as against the respondent. Weight
shall be attached to the relevance of the claim
and to the connection of the parties to the claim.’
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CONTROL OF AND ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE OPPOSING PARTY: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW
is frequently used in connection with ESI. The court is
given a broad discretion in deciding whether the risk is
clear enough. In Oslo Bilauksjon v A and X AS, the
applicant alleged that the respondent breached a
competition clause in the employment contract and also
a breach of confidentiality. A was a former employee of
the applicant, a company that held open and closed car
auctions, and was now employed by X AS, a company
who had started an auction business. The applicant
applied for securing of evidence, including ESI regarding
X’s routines and systems for auction operations,
customer lists and correspondence regarding customers
and business partners. The application was rejected in
the county court, but the Court of Appeal found that both
the first requirement, ‘may be of importance’ in a dispute,
and the second requirement first element, ‘a clear risk’ of
evidence being lost or considerably impaired, was met
and ordered the securing of evidence.
In another case, Vema v Larsen and Hessevik,90 a
similar subject matter was also recognized as a case
with ‘clear risk’ of evidence being lost. One employee
and one dealer both resigned from their positions, and
terminated the dealer agreement with Vema and
established private contact with Vema’s suppliers. This
was a breach of a competition clause in the employment
contract and a breach of confidentiality. The court
ordered the securing of evidence from the defendants’
e-mail accounts and their private computers.
The second element in the Norwegian provision is a
development with the DA of 2005 and relates to the
situation where a party needs to assess their legal
position in relation to other potential counterparties
regarding potential litigation. Here it may be important
to the party to gain access to the evidence controlled by
the potential counterparty in order to assess their legal
position, and to secure evidence in case of subsequent
proceedings.91 The provision resembles the English
Norwich Pharmacal orders, named after the case
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Commissioners of Customs &
Excise.92 Such an order could be given if a potential
claimant intends to assert his legal rights against a
wrongdoer, but needs information from the defendant to
identify the wrongdoer. This information must be
necessary to enable action to be initiated.93 Unlike the
Norwegian provision, the subject matter of a Norwich
Pharmacal application is information rather than
evidence.94 This makes it easier to avoid allegations of
‘fishing expeditions’. The preparatory work of the
Dispute Act stresses the importance of avoiding these
kinds of applications, and emphases that ‘the wording
also implies that it concerns an exceptional rule with a
relatively narrow scope’.95 The commentary review of the
Dispute Act states in relation to this that ‘the threshold
for deciding the securing of evidence will be high, and
securing of evidence is an extraordinary instrument that
should not be used without just cause. Evidence can
therefore not be used to “look counterparts in their
cards”.’96
A well-known Norwegian case, Altibox AS v Sandrew
Metronome Norge AS and Filmkameratene AS,97
resembles an application for a Norwich Pharmacal
order. Sandrew Metronome Norge AS and
Filmkameratene AS applied for information about the
identity of an individual behind an IP-address allocated
by the Internet Service Provider (ISP). The subscriber
with this IP-address had been active in file sharing and
had made available copyrighted material owned by the
applicants. Pursuant to the Act on Electronical
Communications § 2-9, information about the identity of
ISP subscribers are confidential. The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that even though this material was
confidential, the court had the power to order the
securing of evidence pursuant to DA ch. 28. The
judgment was kept secret from both the subscriber and
the public until the securing of evidence had been
completed.
At first glance, the Norwegian provision might give the
impression that the jurisdictional threshold is higher
than the English. However, it is arguable that the words
‘clear risk’ and ‘particular importance’, despite the
statements in the preparatory works, are easily met
regarding ESI. For instance, if the applicant is able to
provide evidence to make it probable that the
respondent has acted in contravention of an agreement,
it is then possible for an applicant to allege that the
counterparty might delete the relevant evidence.
Despite the wording, it appears that the jurisdictional
threshold is lower in Norway than in England & Wales.
Not giving notice to the counterparty ahead of the
search
The possibility of not giving notice to the counterparty is
probably one of the most important differences between
the English pre-action disclosure and the Norwegian
securing of evidence. This element is mainly used in
cases regarding ESI.98 The provision in Norway is as
90 08-095049TVI-AHER/1.
91 NOU 2001:32 Rett på sak, p. 987.
92 [1974] A.C. 133, [1973] 3 WLR 164, [1973] 2 All ER
943, HL.
93 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 59.
94 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 62.
95 NOU 2001:32 Rett på sak, p. 988.
96 Tore Schei and others, Tvisteloven (2007), p.
1249.
97 Tore Schei and others, Tvisteloven (2007), p.
1249.
98 Maria Astrup Hjort, Regulering av e-post som
bevis etter den nye tvisteloven – praktiske og
rettslige utfordringer, in Festskrift til
Jussformidlingens 35- årsjubileum (2008), Det
juridiske fakultets skriftserie nr. 114, p. 132.
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follows:
§ 28-3 Begjæring om bevissikring. Rettens avgjørelse
[…] (3) Bevissikring kan iverksettes straks dersom rask
gjennomføring er nødvendig for å sikre beviset. Om
mulig skal motparten varsles før bevissikringen slik at
motparten kan la seg representere under denne.
Dersom varsling ikke lar seg gjennomføre i tide, skal
retten så vidt mulig oppnevne en representant for
motparten 2 og snarest underrette motparten om det
som er foretatt.
§ 28-3 The application for securing evidence. The
ruling of the court
[…] (3) The court may order the securing of evidence
without notification of the opposite party, provided
that there is reason to fear that notifying the opposite
party could prevent evidence from being secured.
Neither the counterparty nor the public should be
notified of the case before the securing of evidence is
completed, or more than six months have passed
since the case was closed. The applicant should not
be allowed access to the evidence until the ruling is
final in circumstances where it may be of importance
to the opposite party to prevent such access. § 32-8
applies correspondingly. An application from the
counterparty for oral proceedings must be done
within two weeks after the securing is conducted.
The possibility of not giving notice to the counterparty
was introduced in 2004 to meet the Norwegian
obligations under the TRIPS-agreement.99 Even though
the agreement applies only to intellectual property
rights, the provision was made general on the grounds
that ‘the need to secure evidence without notice to the
other party can actually be just as large in other cases
as in infringement of intellectual property rights.’100
Preparatory works stressed that ‘it is just exceptionally
permitted to make important judgements without the
other party beeing heard’.101 It seems as if the exception
has become the rule.
The Norwegian provision may resemble the rule in
CPR 25.1(1)(h), previously known as Anton Piller
orders.102 These orders direct the defendant to permit
the claimant to enter premises and search for and copy
or take away specified material.103 It is not certain how
frequently this is used to give disclosure of ESI before
the proceedings are started, even though it might be
possible, in accordance with the provisions of CPR
25.1(1)(b). However, there must be a need to prevent a
denial of justice, and an order for delivering up the
materials will not be sufficient.104 In addition, the
applicant is not permitted, without the permission of
the court, to use any information obtained as a result of
the order for the purpose of any civil proceedings, other
than the claim.105 These orders are mainly made by the
High Court – the county court’s power to make search
orders are very limited.106 In comparison, in Norway, the
corresponding provision (DA § 28-3 (4)) is basically
used to secure electronic evidence, and the power to
order the securing of evidence is open to courts on all
levels.
The court’s discretionary power
In both jurisdictions the court has a discretionary power
to decide whether a pre-action disclosure is appropriate
or not. It appears that the English courts handle this
power with care. Pre-action disclosure is only ordered if
there is some feature of the case which makes it
unusual.107 If the application seems speculative, the
court will not give order for disclosure.108 The problem in
relation to the Norwegian rules is that handling cases
through the ordinary run is not a satisfying option when
it comes to ESI. The result is that the court tends to
authorize the securing of evidence in more usual cases,
lowering the jurisdictional threshold and being
generous in their discretionary assessments. 
This discussion of the Norwegian procedure of
securing evidence might give an impression of a legal
system struggling to find out how the rules should be
implemented. Such an image is not necessarily
incorrect. Generally, more evidence is created and
stored electronically, and when securing evidence is the
most reasonable procedure to obtain access to the
evidence, the system encounters difficulties. Arguably,
Norway might continue to have difficulties unless
Practice Directions are introduced, or some other kind of
guidance is provided to the parties and the courts
99 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, which is part of the
WTO-agreement.
100 Ot.prp.nr.33 (2003-2004), p. 6.
101 NOU 2001:32 Rett på sak, p. 989. See also Tore
Schei and others, Tvisteloven (2007), p. 1254.
102 Named after the case Anton Piller K.G. v
Manufacturing Processes Ltd. [1976] 1 Ch 55.
103 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek QC,
Disclosure, p. 34.
104 Stephen Mason, ‘England & Wales’, in
Electronic Evidence, p. 357. Mason categorizes
these orders as pre-trial, but they could also be
ordered pre-action, cf. CPR 25.2(2)(b).
105 Paul Matthews and Hodge M. Malek Q.C.,
Disclosure, p. 38.
106 County Courts (Remedies) Regulation 1991 No.
1222 (L.8), reg. 3
107 Kneale v Barclays Bank Plc [2010] EWHC 1900
(Comm) at 45.
108 BSW Limited v Balltec Limited [2006] EWHC 822
(Pat) at 81-82, Pineway Limited v London Mining
Company Limited [2010] EWHC 1143 (Comm) at
53-54, and Kneale v Barclays Bank Plc [2010]
EWHC 1900 (Comm) at 52.
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through procedural rules.
Concluding remarks
Handling electronic stored information is a challenge in
all jurisdictions. The English system has coped with the
challenge by providing practice directions especially for
electronic disclosure. Since the English system already
has the disclosure system and the parties are used to
searching for all relevant materials, the disclosure of
electronic documents is just another item added to the
list. The system is based on trust and co-operation
between the parties, and it is likely that in most cases
evidence adversely affecting the party’s own case will
usually be brought to the attention of the other party
during the disclosure exercise. Search orders, whether
pre-action or pre-trail, that are based on a party’s fear
that the evidence will be deleted or manipulated seems
to be rare. The system is more streamlined than the
Norwegian system, but on the other hand it is more
expensive.
In Norway it has been assumed that ESI as evidence
can be handled by the general rules, and except for the
securing of evidence, there is no reasonable solution on
how to obtain electronic information adversely affecting
and in hands of the counterparty. Securing evidence
should be an exceptional rule, not the only possibility in
such cases. This is not a consideration of the Norwegian
system as such. The system seems to work satisfactory
with other forms of evidence. The problem is that there
have not been enough adjustments to ESI as evidence,
and this is highlighted when the evidence is in the
hands of and adversely affecting the counterparty. The
attitude ‘you cannot trust your counterparty’ makes
handling ESI as evidence even more difficult. If the
obligation to provide relevant information adversely
affecting the party’s own case were more strictly
interpreted and sanctions were used on a larger scale, a
party may not, perhaps, have to apply for the securing
of evidence to make sure that it can get access to the
evidence.
In legal systems with and without disclosure, there
will always be a risk that not all the relevant evidence
will be presented. In many ways, ESI as evidence
challenges legal procedural systems because of the
massive amounts of information that is stored with little
or no structure. A procedural system can cause
problems to the parties, where there is a possibility of
drowning in less relevant evidence or failing to obtain
relevant evidence. It is not realistic to ‘turn every stone’.
The aim should be to develop a system where the
parties contribute in turning only the necessary stones
without significant costs.
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